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Abstract 
 
This study aims to construct a model of the economic behavior of banks as intermediate sectors 
in macroeconomics that play an important role interplaying between financial and real markets 
based on a theoretical and empirical perspective.  
There are two distinguishing characteristics of our approach. First, we specify an economic 
model of banking behavior, following partially assets and liabilities management (ALM). ALM 
is a practical system that commercial banks introduce for assessing and managing a bank’s risk 
exposure and a huge and complex system. As the primary object of our paper is to provide an 
understanding of a bank’s role in macroeconomics rather than the details of ALM, we abstract 
from that concept and embed its crucial factors into the model specification. Second, we assume 
that banks have two optimization problems: profit maximization and asset allocation. Banks are 
assumed to maximize the profit function which takes into consideration items of the balance sheet 
and income statement. Simultaneously, banks are assumed to attempt to determine their optimal 
portfolio among choices of federal and state federal and state government bonds, municipal bonds, 
corporate bonds, stocks, and foreign securities. 
Although our model is remarkably simple, we consider that our framework is valid to 
illustrate the mechanism of the loan market. Especially, we believe that our approach could 
provide us a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of the lending market by linking it to a 
macroeconomic model that includes various markets.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The history of unconventional monetary policy by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) dates back to its zero-
interest-rate policy that was implemented in order to overcome deflation in February 1999. Since 
then, Japan undertook a quantitative easing (QE) policy from 2001 to 2006. After the global 
financial crisis, the BOJ further expanded its QE program in 2010 by purchasing additional risky 
assets such as ETF, J-REIT, and corporate bonds. The BOJ once again expanded the QE program 
on a larger scale in 2013 and late 2015. Furthermore, in early 2016, the BOJ introduced a negative 
interest rate policy. Thus, the low-interest-rate environment has continued more than two decades 
now, when the first unconventional monetary policy was introduced. However, Japan has not 
achieved its price stability target of two percent yet. Indeed, these monetary policies have reached 
the limits of their effectiveness. 
In response to the global financial crisis, a number of studies have attempted to understand 
the mechanism of financial crisis and to evaluate optimal monetary policies. In particular, a recent 
strand within the literature focuses on banks of financial intermediaries linking them between 
financial markets and the real economy, a motif which has been neglected as a research topic, 
examining how the financial intermediation sector affects money flowing into the real economy. 
On the basis of a macroeconomic model approach, Eggertsson, et al. (2017) evaluated the impact 
of low and negative interest rates on the macroeconomy by applying a New-Keynesian model 
with a certain banking behavior. As for the studies on the partial and specific perspectives, Bario, 
et al. (2017a; 2017b), Jobst and Lin (2016), and Lopez (2018) shed light on the relation between 
low and negative interest rates and bank profitability by using bank-level data. While these studies 
have provided important insights into understanding transmission channel of monetary policy, 
they are insufficient to capture the more practical aspects of banking behavior. 
Conventionally, the principal operation for banks is considered to rely on its loans and 
deposits. Their primary profits are based on the net interest margin between the interest they pay 
on customer deposits and the interest they receive on loans. However, this banking business model 
has changed due to the prolonged low-interest-rate environment. Each panel in Figure 1 shows 
outstanding loans, outstanding discounts applied, and securities holdings of domestic banks, city 
banks, and local banks, respectively. It also represents the policy interest rate (uncollateralized 
overnight call rates) and the government bond interest rate. Overall, the amount of lending by 
banks has been increasing. In particular, loans by local banks (Panel C of Figure 1) have risen 
steadily. On the one hand, since rate policies have keep them close to zero and long-term interest 
rates have continued to decline, suggesting that the profits from increasing loans would be offset 
by available interest rates. On the other hand, one may see a tendency to increase securities 
holdings by each bank, at least compared to the early 2000s. In order to see implications of this 
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fact shown in Figure 1, we consider further details about banks’ securities holdings.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Japanese Banks’ Historical Performances of Loans and Securities Holding   
 
Figure 2 illustrates composition ratio of securities holdings: federal and state government 
bonds, federal and state government bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds, stocks, and foreign 
securities. While holdings of low-risk assets (i.e., federal and state government bonds) have 
decreased steadily, holdings of higher-risk assets (i.e., corporate bonds and stocks) have expanded. 
More concretely, city banks (Panel B of Figure 2) have shifted their asset allocations from 
favoring federal and state government bonds to stocks and foreign securities. Local banks (Panel 
B of Figure 2) have increased corporate bonds rather than federal and state government bonds. 
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That is to say, Figure 2 explains that asset allocation has changed from low-return assets to high-
return ones. It implies that the banks have attempted to generate their profits through financial 
assets rather than by expanding their loan base. 
 
 
Figure 2. Composition Ratio of Securities Holdings in of Japanese Banks 
 
As noted above, two facts have been discovered. First, a prolonged low-interest-rate 
environment has led to narrowing of net interest margins for banks, resulting in an impact on bank 
profitability. Second, banks responded sensitively to this serious situation by attempting to ensure 
their profits through reinforcing greater investment in financial assets rather than expanding their 
loan base, in order to make up the losses in net interest income (owing to low interest rate). It is 
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noteworthy that banks have been expanded the holdings of higher-risk assets like stocks.  
In this study, in order to reflect such real aspects of banks, we aim at specifying an economic 
model of banking behavior, partially following the concept of assets and liabilities management 
(ALM). ALM is a huge and complex system that commercial banks introduce to assess and 
manage their risk exposure practically. As the primary objective of our paper is to provide an 
understanding of the role of banks macroeconomically rather than highlight the details of ALM, 
we abstract from ALM and embed its crucial factors into the model specification. Specifically, we 
assume that banks have two optimization problems: profit maximization and asset allocation. First, 
banks are assumed to maximize their profit function, which leads them to consider balance sheet 
and income statement items. Second, banks are assumed to attempt to determine their optimal 
portfolios among federal and state government bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds, stocks, 
and foreign securities. Although our model is quite simple, we consider the framework to be valid 
for illustrating the mechanism of the loan market. In particular, we believe that our approach 
provides a deeper understanding about the loan market mechanism by linking it with a 
macroeconomic model that includes various markets.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief literature review 
and explain our approach. Section 3 outlines the analytical framework of the loan market by 
specifying banking behavior. Section 4 provides a description of the data that are utilized in this 
study. In Section 5, we present the empirical results. Our concluding remarks are given in Section 
6. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and Study Approach 
 
The primary focus of our paper is to specify banks’ behaviors. By linking this aim to the whole 
model developed in our previous studies (Shibata and Kosaka 2018, Shibata 2016), we believe 
that we can obtain a better guide to explaining how a central bank’s monetary policy impacts the 
real economy via various markets. This section illustrates the “big picture” of our model by 
reviewing previous contributions related to our approach.  
 
 
2.1 A Literature Review 
Over the past eighty years, numerous studies have contributed to developing financial models 
both theoretically and empirically. In this section, we summarize representative works below. 
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A) One of the cornerstones of monetary models is liquidity preference theory in the book entitled 
The General Theory of Employment. Interest and Money by Keynes (1936) who argues that 
an inverse relationship exists between the demand for cash balances and the rate of interest. 
One year later, in 1937, in order to capture Keynes’ essential ideas (1936), Hicks (1937) 
developed the IS-LM model that is composed of simultaneous equalities between goods 
supplied and goods demanded (IS), and between money demanded and money supplied (LM), 
to obtain equilibrium figures for GNP and interest rates. R. Klein and W.E. Krelle (1983) 
then asserted that endogenous money supply should be taken into consideration. Hence, 
liquidity preference theory has become more sophisticated since the 1960s. Yet, these 
conventional models were based on the simple framework wherein the long-term interest 
rate is determined based on equilibrium in the market for money.  
 
B) Tobin (1969) challenged Keynes’ theory of demand for money from the viewpoint of a 
general framework for monetary analysis. The main drawback of Keynes’ perspective 
demand for money was to assume that individuals would hold all their liquid assets either as 
money or bonds. It implied that holding money was the alternative to holding bonds. This 
assumption did not reflect reality. Thus, Tobin developed a general equilibrium to monetary 
theory by extending Keynes’ model of the transaction demand for money and introducing 
portfolio theory. Following Tobin (1969) and Brunner-Meltzer (1972), Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) and Ueda (1993) constructed the modified monetary model where loans and bonds 
are imperfect substitutes. Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998) further incorporated real estate market 
into the framework of Ueda (1993a;1993b), resulting in providing crucial insights about the 
important role of the collateral channel within the call market, short-term monetary market, 
government bond market, real estate market and the real marketplace in general. 
 
C) Modigliani, Rasche and Cooper (1970) provided a new framework, the reserve market 
equilibrium where short-term interest rates are determined, and the long-term interest rate is 
set. In addition, Modigliani and Shiller (1973) introduced the term structure of interest rates, 
along with the relationship between short- and long-term rates. Following the term structure 
by Modigliani and Shiller (1973), Sadahiro (1992) established a Japanese financial model.  
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Table 1. Chart of Historical Monetary Models 
 Keynes 
(1936) 
Klein 
(1983) 
Shibata 
& Kosaka 
Modigliani 
(1970) 
Brainard 
& Tobin 
(1969) 
Ogawa 
& Kitasaka 
(1998) 
Reserve Market  〇 〇 〇  × 
Walras’Law 
Money Market 〇 〇 〇    
Call Market    △   〇 
Short Term Monetary Market    △ × 
Walras’Law 
  
Government Bond Market × Walras’Law 
× 
Walras’Law  〇   
Lending Market   △   〇 
Corporate Bond Market   △    
Japan Stock Market    △    
U.S. Bond Market   △    
U.S. Government Bond Market   △    
Commodity Market (including future market)    〇    
Land Market   〇   〇 
Real Market 〇 〇 〇 〇  〇 
Note: 〇 shows that models are based on an equilibrium. △ represents that models are illustrated on the equation. 
 
 
2.2 Our Approach 
Our approach is summarized as follows:  
 
1) Diversification of Assets in the Market 
Generalizing the basic model of Tobin (1958) that consists of two assets, i.e., money and bonds, 
we re-specify the money-demand function (liquidity preference) by expanding the portfolio from 
domestic bonds to short-term assets, stocks, corporate bonds, and even U.S. Treasury bonds (see 
Shibata and Kosaka, 2018; Kosaka, 2017). Then, as the short-term interest rate is closely linked 
to policy instruments (namely, the call rate), the money-demand function is linked with a policy 
instrument via the short-term market; at the same time, it is connected to U.S. government bonds. 
 
2) Endogenizing M1 
As Table 1 shows, there are few studies which focus on banks as intermediaries in macro economy. 
The Japanese bank-lending market constructed by Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998) has the mechanism 
that an interest rate of loans is determined when the loan market is in equilibrium. However, in 
reality, the loan interest rate can be affected by factors other than the demand or supply for loans. 
We endogenize money stock (M1) in Shibata and Kosaka (2018),1 which explains M1 in 
terms of reserve money and a bank’s loans. The money supply is assumed to relate with loans via 
                                                   
1 Shibata and Kosaka (2018) assume that money supply 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 is determined by reserve money 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 
and lending by banks like 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 = 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵). This study specifies 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵.  
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money creation—the so-called “money multiplier.” By developing banks’ lending behavior in this 
study and introducing it into the model of Shibata and Kosaka (2018) in the future, the 
transmission channel between the loan market and money supply is enhanced much further.  
 
3) Assets and Liabilities Management (ALM) of Banks  
We specify banking behavior that is partially motivated by the ALM concept being injected into 
our model for the purpose of reflecting the reality of the lending mechanism. ALM is a system 
for assessing and managing a banking company’s risk exposure comprehensively, based on its 
balance sheet and income statement.  
 
 
3. Model 
 
In this section, we formalize the economic behavior of the financial intermediary sector. The 
model is composed of loan and portfolio optimization. Simplifying the concept of ALM, loan 
optimization stems from an understanding of the profit or loss statement, and portfolio 
optimization represents ideal balance-sheet management. Optimal lending is determined by profit 
maximization, and optimal portfolio by asset allocation theory (Markowitz, 1952). This model 
reflects current banks’ behaviors. 
 
3.1 Determining Optimal Banking Loans 
We begin with considering the banks’ profit maximization problem. Basically, banks attempt to 
choose optimal loans to households and firms in non-financial industries that maximize their 
profits generated from the spread between the interest rates charged on lending and that paid to 
depositors. Banks have some expenses like fees and commissions’ expense other than interest 
expense for deposits. In addition, holdings of bad loans discourage banks from lending. The profit 
maximization problem of banks can be formalized as follows:  
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𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 =  −12𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1�𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 − 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷)�2������������������������� the difference between loans and deposits   −12𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵2(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹)2�����������������
the difference between capital investment loans
and borrowing demand
 
 −12𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵3(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻)2�����������������
the difference between housing loans
and borrowing demand
 
+ 1
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
∗ �  𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵���
the interest income from loans   −𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0 + 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵1𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵)�������������the interest expense for deposits  −𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵𝜓𝜓𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵−1𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵���������
holding of bad debts   −𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵−1(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷)  �������������������fees and comissions′ expenses � 
(1)  
 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 
𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 
: outstanding loans 
: capital investment loans  
: housing loans 
: outstanding deposits 
: certificate of deposits 
: fixed investments (SNA) 
: housing investments (SNA) 
 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵  
𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  
𝜑𝜑𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 
𝜓𝜓𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 ,𝑡𝑡−1 
𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵−1 
𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 
 
: lending rate 
: interest rate on deposits 
: loan to deposit ratio 
: holding ratio of bad debts during the previous 
month 
: operating costs 
: reserve requirement ratio 
 
where 𝑤𝑤0,𝑤𝑤1 ,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3,𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝛼𝛼3,𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2,𝛽𝛽3 are parameters. Profit function (1) is an optimization 
problem with three constraints that are represented by a quadratic-loss term: i) the gap between 
loans and deposits, ii) the gap between loans and borrowing demand for capital investments, iii) 
the gap between loans and borrowing demand for housing investments. The quadratic-loss terms 
impose more penalties as the level of banks’ lending become distant from ideal points. In addition, 
equation (1) illustrates the reality that the amount of bad debt leads to banks’ reluctance to lend. 
With respect to 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1, the first order condition for the banks’ problems are defined as:  
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1
= −𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1�𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 − 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷)� − 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵2(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹) �1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1 𝜕𝜕𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1� + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
∗ −
𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵1
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
∗ −
𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵𝜓𝜓𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵−1
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
∗ = 0 (2)  
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where investment 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹  is presumably affected by macroeconomic factors. 2 Here, the term of 
partial derivatives 𝜕𝜕𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1⁄  , we set 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1  as conjecture variation by banks. 3  Additionally, 
substituting 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵∗  to 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 and rearranging equation (2), the revised equation is given as:  
�𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵2(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵)�𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) −𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2 
(3)  
+(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵)𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵2𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 − 𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵1𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵𝜓𝜓𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵−1𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 + 1 
For simplicity, we insert 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵2(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) = 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1  for equation (4). By doing so, the 
optimal lending for capital investment given by, 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) − 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1)𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵2𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻  
−
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵1
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1
𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
−
𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1
𝜓𝜓𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵−1
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
+ 1
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1
 
(4)  
In addition, following the foregoing process, the optimal lending for housing investment 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2 is 
defined as: 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2 = 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) − 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵1𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵1 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2)𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵3𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵2𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹  
−
𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵1
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2
𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
−
𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2
𝜓𝜓𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵−1
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
+ 1
𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵2
 
(5)  
Equations (4) and (5) state that the amount of the loan base depends on the level of deposits and 
investment demand from the macroeconomy. Also, if the interest rates earned on deposits are 
relatively higher (lower) than those paid on loans, banks tend to be encouraged to increase 
(decrease) loans. Simultaneously, the level of lending becomes negative in relation to the degree 
of bad loan holdings.  
                                                   
2 This study assumes macroeconomic condition as given. However, this is one of important monetary 
transmission channels connecting between financial market and real economy. Linking to macro 
model would be realized in future studies.  
3 We assume that banks conjecture how the investment will be adjusted with respect to potential 
adjustments in macro economy.  
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3.2 Determining Optimal Asset Allocation of Banks  
Next, we consider banks’ asset allocation. We assume that banks invest the loan-deposit gap in 
assets as follows:  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐿𝐿�𝐵𝐵＝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (6)  
where 𝐿𝐿�𝐵𝐵  means the optimal loans, which are determined by equations (4) and (5). 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
represents banks’ holding securities. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 contains these five assets: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  (7)  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺  means holding of federal and state government bonds, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺  means municipal 
bonds, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺   means corporate bonds, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶   means stocks, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  means foreign 
stocks. Also, the ratio of securities held is shown by: 
𝑤𝑤1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑤𝑤1𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑤𝑤1𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑤𝑤1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + 𝑤𝑤1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 1 (8)  
where 𝑤𝑤𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿⁄  , 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿⁄  , 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 =
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿⁄  , 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿⁄   and 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿⁄  . They show the 
share ratio of government bond holdings, municipal bond holdings, corporate bond holdings, 
stock holdings, and foreign securities holdings, respectively.  
Then, banks attempt to construct a portfolio of five assets which maximizes expected return. 
We assume optimization of portfolio by applying Markowitz (1952)’s mean-variance portfolio 
theory. Here, we begin with its general formulation. Portfolio return is defined as: 
𝑆𝑆(𝑅𝑅) = 𝑤𝑤′𝑓𝑓 (9)  
∑ is defined as the covariance matrix of returns. 
𝜎𝜎2 = 𝑤𝑤′∑𝑤𝑤 (10)  
Investors are assumed to choose portfolios 𝑤𝑤 in order to maximize expected return subject to 
the target level of risks. The mean-variance portfolio optimization is formulated as:  
max
𝑤𝑤
    𝑤𝑤′𝑓𝑓 = − 12𝜌𝜌 𝑤𝑤′∑𝑤𝑤  (11)  
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𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  𝜎𝜎2 = 𝑤𝑤′𝛴𝛴𝑤𝑤  
 𝑤𝑤′𝑠𝑠 = 1  
where 𝑓𝑓shows 𝜌𝜌 represents risk capacity of the investor. To solve the constrained maximization 
problem (11), the Lagrangian is defined as: 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑤𝑤′𝑓𝑓 − 12𝜌𝜌𝑤𝑤′∑𝑤𝑤 + 𝜆𝜆(𝑤𝑤′𝑠𝑠 − 1) (12)  
where 𝜆𝜆 implies the Lagrangian multiplier. And the first order conditions for maximization are:  
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
= 𝑓𝑓 − 1
𝜌𝜌
∑𝑤𝑤 + 𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 = 0 (13)  
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
= (𝑤𝑤′𝑠𝑠 − 1) = 0 (14)  
Rearranging equations (13) and (14), the following equations are obtained,  
∑𝑤𝑤 − 𝜆𝜆𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 = 𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓 (15)  
𝑤𝑤′𝑠𝑠 = 1 (16)  
The matrix representation is as follows; 
�∑ −𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠′ 0 � �𝑤𝑤𝜆𝜆� = �𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓1 � (17)  
In this study, we assume that banks invest in five assets, namely federal and state government 
bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds, domestic stocks, and foreign securities. Namely, the 
covariance matrix of five risk assets is represented as follows: 
Σ =
⎝
⎜
⎛
𝜎𝜎11 𝜎𝜎12 𝜎𝜎13 𝜎𝜎14 𝜎𝜎15
𝜎𝜎21 𝜎𝜎22 𝜎𝜎23 𝜎𝜎24 𝜎𝜎25
𝜎𝜎31 𝜎𝜎32 𝜎𝜎33 𝜎𝜎34 𝜎𝜎35
𝜎𝜎41 𝜎𝜎42 𝜎𝜎43 𝜎𝜎44 𝜎𝜎45
𝜎𝜎51 𝜎𝜎52 𝜎𝜎53 𝜎𝜎54 𝜎𝜎55⎠
⎟
⎞
 (18)  
Replacing Σ of equation (17) for (18), we yield the following equation.  
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⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝑤𝑤1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝑤𝑤1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝛾𝛾 ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞ =
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
𝜎𝜎11 𝜎𝜎12 𝜎𝜎13 𝜎𝜎14 𝜎𝜎15 −𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎21 𝜎𝜎22 𝜎𝜎23 𝜎𝜎24 𝜎𝜎25 −𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎31 𝜎𝜎32 𝜎𝜎33 𝜎𝜎34 𝜎𝜎35 −𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎41 𝜎𝜎42 𝜎𝜎43 𝜎𝜎44 𝜎𝜎45 −𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎51 𝜎𝜎52 𝜎𝜎53 𝜎𝜎54 𝜎𝜎55 −𝜌𝜌1 1 1 1 1 0 ⎠⎟⎟
⎞
−1
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇1 ⎠⎟
⎟
⎞
 (19)  
 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 
𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺  
𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶  
: expected government bond yield  
: expected local government bond yield 
: expected corporate bond yield 
 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇  : expected stock return : expected foreign securities return 
We simplify the inverse covariance matrix of equation (19) as follows: 
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝑤𝑤1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝑤𝑤1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝛾𝛾 ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞ =
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
𝑎𝑎11 𝑎𝑎12 𝑎𝑎13 𝑎𝑎14 𝑎𝑎15 𝑎𝑎16
𝑎𝑎21 𝑎𝑎22 𝑎𝑎23 𝑎𝑎24 𝑎𝑎25 𝑎𝑎26
𝑎𝑎31 𝑎𝑎32 𝑎𝑎33 𝑎𝑎34 𝑎𝑎35 𝑎𝑎36
𝑎𝑎41 𝑎𝑎42 𝑎𝑎43 𝑎𝑎44 𝑎𝑎45 𝑎𝑎46
𝑎𝑎51 𝑎𝑎52 𝑎𝑎53 𝑎𝑎54 𝑎𝑎55 𝑎𝑎56
𝑎𝑎61 𝑎𝑎62 𝑎𝑎63 𝑎𝑎64 𝑎𝑎65 𝑎𝑎66⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇1 ⎠⎟
⎟
⎞
 (20)  
The optimal shares of asset holdings are generated as: 
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝑤𝑤1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑤𝑤1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝑤𝑤1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝛾𝛾 ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝑎𝑎11𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎12𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎13𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎14𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎15𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎16
𝑎𝑎21𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎22𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎23𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎24𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎25𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎26
𝑎𝑎31𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎32𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎33𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎34𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎35𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎36
𝑎𝑎41𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎42𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎43𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎44𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎45𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎46
𝑎𝑎51𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎52𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎53𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎54𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎55𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎56
𝑎𝑎61𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎62𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎63𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎64𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎65𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎66⎠⎟
⎟
⎞
 (21)  
Here, we modify equation (21) for estimation. The estimation of regression coefficients in 
equation (21) are likely to be unstable because the values of the dependent variables are ratios. 
Hence, we decompose them into two components, e.g., holdings of each portfolio and all 
securities holdings, and then utilize a variable for all securities holdings as the independent 
variable. The modified equation is shown as follows: 
⎝
⎜
⎛
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶1𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ⎠⎟
⎞ =
⎝
⎜
⎛
𝑎𝑎11𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎12𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎13𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎14𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎15𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎16𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎17
𝑎𝑎21𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎22𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎23𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎24𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎25𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎26𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎27
𝑎𝑎31𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎32𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎33𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎34𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎35𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎36𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎37
𝑎𝑎41𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎42𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎43𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎44𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎45𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎46𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎47
𝑎𝑎51𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎52𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝑎𝑎53𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎54𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎55𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 + 𝑎𝑎56𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎57⎠⎟
⎞
 (22)  
We apply equation (22) for empirical analysis.  
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4. Data 
 
We consider tracing the bank’s balance sheet and accounts in order to conduct empirical analysis 
for the conceptual discussion in the previous section. We use data from several sources. 
 
(1) Financial Statements 
Our main data sources for the financial statements of domestic banks are Financial and Economic 
Statistics Monthly, which were published by the Bank of Japan from February 1998 to May 2018. 
This statistic provides key data about the financial accounts and balance sheets from each banking 
category, e.g., like city and local banks, as well as total figures for domestic banks, including 
assets (loans/securities) and liabilities (deposits/certificates of deposit). The data of banks’ 
holdings of securities are categorized into five kinds of assets like federal and state government 
bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds, stock or shares, and foreign securities.  
 
(2) Interest Rates 
Additionally, we use monthly data for interest rates published by Bank of Japan: uncollateralized 
overnight call rate, lending rate, certificate of deposit rate, ten-year government bond interest rate. 
Federal Funds rate, discount policy rate of the United States, garnered from the Federal Reserve 
Bank. 
 
(3) Other Data 
We also utilize financial statements and related data pertaining to all banks (i.e., balance sheets 
and income statements) complied by Japanese Bankers Association. The Japanese Bankers 
Association discloses these items, both on consolidated and non-consolidated bases, of individual 
banks, as well as the totals for each category of bank every six months (year-end/interim). In 
particular, our study employs data of risk-monitored loans (i.e., four levels of risk: loans to 
bankrupt borrowers, delinquent loans, loans past due three months or more, and restructured 
loans) to estimate an optimal lending model. However, the frequency of this data is different from 
those found in the monthly financial statements. We interpolate missing values for the time series 
by inserting the same value. The supply-side data of investments (i.e., real estate investments and 
capital investments) that banks provide to households and firms in non-financial industries are 
from bank accounts of domestically licensed banks (by the Bank of Japan). In contrast, the 
demand-side data pertaining to housing and capital investments for gross fixed-capital formation 
comes from the national accounts published by the Cabinet Office, government of Japan. As for 
the exchange rate, we use data from the International Financial Statistics database.  
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5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Estimation Results  
We estimate the stochastic equations of banking behavior by applying ordinary least squares. This 
section provides the estimation results.  
 
5.1.1 Estimation Results of Optimal Loans 
Table 2 gives the estimated results for optimal bank loans for capital investments as discussed in 
equation (4) of subsection 3.1.1. Statistics show that the optimal loan level for capital investment 
is well-estimated. The response of bank lending to the interest rate and bad loan holding is 
statistically explained well, too. The empirical results suggest that bad debt risk is associated with 
the banks’ lending activities, resulting in them being reluctant to lend. Lending by banks is less 
responsive to private demand for investments. Further, Table 3 describes the results of optimal 
bank loan levels for housing investment seen in equation (5). Similarly, just as our results 
pertaining to capital investment showed, we confirm the response of bank lending to interest rate 
changes and the level of bad debts. Also, housing investments cannot confirm the effect of private 
demand for housing investment. We conclude that the optimal lending model of banks is 
acceptable.  
 
Table 2. Optimal Loan for Capital Investment：Sample 1998M2-2018M05 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
Deposit (t-3) plus Certificate of Deposit (t-3) 0.302*** 0.007 
Outstanding of Lending for Housing -0.423*** 0.039 
Demand for Investment (t-12) 0.385 0.278 
Interest Rate on Deposit (t-12)/ Interest Rate on Lending (t-12) -12413.430* 6779.996 
Holding of Bankruptcy Debts (t-12) / Interest Rate on Lending (t-9)  -0.367*** 0.054 
Constant 461012.6*** 39869.04 
Observation   232 
Adj. R-squared  0.988 
Table 3. Optimal Loans for Housing: Sample 1998M10-2018M05 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
Deposit (t-3) plus Certificate of Deposit (t-3) 0.464*** 0.020 
Outstanding of Lending for Fixed Investment -1.280*** 0.082 
Interest Rate on Deposit (t-12)/ Interest Rate on Lending (t-12) -120766.8** 46114.470 
Holding of Bankruptcy Debts (t-12) / Interest Rate on Lending (t-9) -1.001*** 0.077 
Dummy from 2008M09 to 2009M12 33813.790*** 11529.810 
Constant 685876.700*** 42788.060 
Observation   236 
Adj. R-squared  0.987 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1, respectively. 
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5.1.2 Estimation Results of the Optimal Portfolio 
In this subsection, we show estimated results for our portfolio selection model of equation (22). 
The result of each asset is reported below.  
 
(1) Optimal Government Bond Holdings 
Banks are assumed to determine the optimal investment amount in each asset class based on 
expected returns of each asset and its variance. In Table 4, the optimal portfolio for federal and 
state government bonds is reported. Table 4 is divided into three panels: Panel A for domestic 
banks, Panel B for city banks, and Panel C for local banks. All panels have the same signs on their 
coefficients across the panels. Expected returns from government bonds are negative in relation 
to expected returns on other assets. Overall, the results are robust.  
 
Table 4. Portfolio for Government Bonds: Sample 1998M1-2018M2 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variables 
   Panel A:    
All Banks 
   Panel B:    
City Banks 
   Panel C:    
Local Banks 
Interest Rate of Government Bond 10 Year 202488.000*** [50788.25] 
81104.200** 
[25546.29] 
78546.180*** 
[16716.76] 
Interest Rate of Local Government Bond -133845.900** [52855.34] 
-51143.66** 
[24008.71] 
-50800.760** 
[16860.27] 
Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) -93.527*** [26.655] 
-90.949*** 
[15.432] 
-53.880*** 
[5.333] 
Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index -122.531*** [32.374] 
7.202 
[14.606] 
3.290 
[6.428] 
All Holding Securities & Bonds 0.902*** [0.019] 
0.919*** 
[0.014] 
0.594*** 
[0.016] 
Constant -604569.400*** [65489.32] 
-288549.9*** 
[24004.82] 
-76066.730*** 
[9555.003] 
Observation 242 242 242 
Adj. R-squared 0.987 0.992 0.957 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1, respectively. 
 
 
(2) Optimal Corporate and Local Bond Holdings 
As Table 5 and Table 6 show a portfolio of municipal and corporate bonds. The blank spaces 
signify that the estimation is conducted by omitting items from the model due to statistical 
problems. Table 5 tells that local government bond holdings tend to be motivated by expected 
returns from foreign securities. Although the result of corporate bond holdings by city banks 
(Panel B of Table 6) is weak, the others are well-estimated.  
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Table 5. Portfolio of Local Government Bonds: Sample 1998M1-2018M2 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variables 
   Panel A:    
All Banks 
   Panel B:    
City Banks 
   Panel C:    
Local Banks 
Interest Rate of Government Bond 10 Year -41060.44*** [8505.419]  
 
Interest Rate of Local Government Bonds 25258.34** [9211.27] 
4319.123*** 
[689.788] 
-5363.709*** 
[628.781] 
Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) 4.956** [2.263] 
-4.849*** 
[1.634] 
-4.95** 
[1.292] 
Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index  5.96*** [1.436] 
 
All Holding Securities & Bonds 0.024*** [0.003] 
-0.016*** 
[0.001] 
0.078*** 
[0.004] 
Constant 72010.43*** [8562.443] 
23594.84*** 
[2334.28] 
47238.33*** 
[3271.221] 
Observation 242 293 293 
Adj. R-squared 0.706 0.702 0.885  
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Portfolio of Corporate Bonds: Sample 1998M1-2018M2 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variables 
   Panel A:    
All Banks 
   Panel B:    
City Banks 
   Panel C:    
Local Banks 
Interest Rate of Government Bond 10 Year 
 
 -8084.94*** 
(6242.767] 
Interest Rate of Local Government Bond 20648.94*** [2156.306] 
3202.5730.1561 
[2251.874] 
25956.64** 
[6790.84] 
Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) 34.225*** [5.477] 
52.597*** 
[7.13] 
-27.622*** 
[3.128] 
Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index 
 
-27.929*** 
[5.469] 
39.183*** 
[3.304] 
All Holding Securities & Bonds 0.13*** [0.005] 
0.1*** 
[0.005] 
0.114*** 
[0.008] 
Constant -55214.92*** [15216.63] 
-47874.87*** 
[9811.584] 
17046.49*** 
(6184.475] 
Observation 293 293 242 
Adj. R-squared 0.75 0.475 0.910  
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1, respectively. 
 
(3) Optimal Stock Holdings 
In Table 7, the blank spaces signify that the estimation was conducted by omitting certain 
parameters from model due to statistical problems encountered. Overall, the results are weak. The 
results show an inverse relationship between bonds yields and stocks, which has changed over 
time. Additionally, according to result of domestic banks, the relationship between the domestic 
stock market and foreign ones is negative.  
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Table 7. Portfolio of Japanese Stocks: Sample 1998M1-2018M2 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variables 
   Panel A:    
All Banks 
   Panel B:    
City Banks 
   Panel C:    
Local Banks 
Interest Rate of Government Bond 10 Year 52584.1*** [14563.38] 
26931.14*** 
[4494.233] 
1248.0240.2982 
[1197.153] 
Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) -80.956*** [26.931] 
-35.465*** 
[8.568] 
-7.318** 
[1.516] 
Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index 77.238*** [26.028] 
 
 
All Holding Securities & Bonds -0.214*** [0.013] 
-0.177*** 
[0.01] 
-0.032*** 
[0.005] 
Constant 617031.8*** [37955.43] 
348543*** 
[20177.89] 
70565.72*** 
[4441.92] 
Observation 242 242 242 
Adj. R-squared 0.693 0.674 0.361 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1, respectively. 
 
 
(4) Optimal Foreign Securities Holdings 
Table 84 summarizes the results of foreign securities holdings by all national banks and city banks. 
It represents that the foreign securities holdings are strongly motivated by the returns generated 
by the U.S. stock market index. As city banks have a positive sign with respect to TOPIX, we can 
see the interrelation of movement between the Japanese stock index and the U.S.’s. 
 
Table 8. Portfolio of Foreign Securities: Sample 1998M1-2018M2 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variables 
   Panel A:    
All Banks 
   Panel B:    
City Banks 
Interest Rate of Government Bond 10 Year -71796.710*** [15169.96] 
-64692.49*** 
[6353.378] 
Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX)  51.415*** [10.235] 
Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index 91.388*** [16.181] 
18.1160.07 
[9.952] 
All Holding Securities & Bonds  0.118*** [0.016] 
0.144*** 
[0.007] 
Constant 33513.420 [44452.59] 
10943.680.4628 
[14881.04] 
Observation 242 242 
Adj. R-squared 0.877 0.877 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1, respectively. 
 
  
                                                   
4 As local banks’ foreign securities holdings is quite slight, we do not estimate local banks’ model.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This study specifies a model of banking behavior based on an optimization process: profit 
maximization and efficient asset allocation. In particular, our model definitely differs from other 
previous studies in that the crucial concept of ALM is partially embedded into our model in order 
to reflect the practical aspects of bank management. Some variables might be unsatisfactory. 
Nevertheless, the overall performance of this system is acceptable. The estimated results suggest 
that our theoretical approach has grasped the reality of the loan market.  
However, some improvements must be made in order to make the model into a more 
applicable framework for analyzing the reality of the loan market sufficiently. First, we consider 
that a profit function should include other elements such as an equity ratio by following the 
concept of ALM. Second, as our model based on ALM does not introduce the foreign exchange 
market, we cannot trace the reality of the currency risk that banks face. Third, we should take in 
to consideration the land market, which affects the real economy through the collateral channel. 
As a bad loan is assumed to be an exogenous variable in the profit function in our model, it is 
insufficient to calculate economic impacts, e.g., the bubble burst in Japan and the global financial 
crisis.  
This study is also rather simplistic and tentative, but it is just getting started. In the future, 
we are planning to introduce this banking model into the macromonomeric model that we have 
developed so far. By doing so, our model may not only investigate the relevancy between 
negative- and low-interest rates and a bank’s lending behavior, but may also evaluate the adverse 
effects of such rates on banking behavior and macroeconomic issues. We believe that a full model 
would render better guidance in explaining how a central bank’s monetary policy generates 
impacts on the real economy via various financial instrument markets.  
20 
 
References 
 
Bernanke, B.S., and A. S. Blinder. 1992, “The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary 
Transmission”, American Economic Review, Vol. 82(4), pp. 901-921. 
Bernanke, B. S. 1995. “Banking in General Equilibrium,” NBER Working Paper, No. w1647. 
Bernanke, B.S. and V. R. Reinhart. 2004. “Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term 
Interest Rates.” American Economic Review, Vol. 9, No.4, pp. 27-48. 
Bech, M., and A. Malkhozov. 2016. “How have central banks implemented negative policy rates?”, 
BIS Quarterly Review, pp 31–44. 
Borio, C., L. Gambacorta, and B. Hofmann. 2017a. “The influence of monetary policy on bank 
profitability,” International Finance, Vol. 20, pp. 48-63. 
Borio, C., and L. Gambacorta. 2017b. “Monetary policy and bank lending in a low interest rate 
environment: diminishing effectiveness?,” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 54, pp. 217-231. 
Brunner, K., and A. H. Meltzer. 1972. “Money, Debt, and Economic Activity,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 80, pp. 951-977.  
Demiralp, S., J. Eisenschmidt, and T. Vlassopoulos. 2017. “Negative Interest Rates, Excess Liquidity, 
and Bank Business Models: Banks’ Reaction to Unconventional Monetary Policy in the Euro 
Area”, mimeo. 
Eggertsson, G., R. Juelsrud and E. G. Wold. 2017. “Are negative nominal interest rates expansionary?,” 
(Preliminary and incomplete), NBER Working Paper, No.24039. 
Hicks, J. R. 1937. “Mr. Keynes and the “Classics”; A Suggested Interpretation,” Econometrica, Vol. 
5(2), pp. 147-159. 
Honda, Y. 2014. “The Effectiveness of Nontraditional Monetary Policy: The Case of Japan.” The 
Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, March 2014. 
Jobst, A., and H. Lin, 2016. “Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP): Implications for Monetary 
Transmission and Bank Profitability in the Euro Area,” IMF Working Paper, WP/16/172. 
Keynes, J.M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London: Macmillan. 
Kiyotaki, M., and J. Moore. 1997. “Credit Cycles,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol 105(2), 
pp.211-248. 
Klein, R., and W. E. Krelle. 1983. “Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Determination,” Journal of 
Economics, Supplement 3. 
Kosaka, H. 2017. “The Monetary Modeling for Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy,” 
SFC Discussion Paper, SFC-DP 2016-006. (in Japanese) 
Kuroda, H. 2016. “The Battle Against Deflation: The Evolution of Monetary Policy and Japan’s 
Experience (Speech at Columbia University in New York).” The Bank of Japan. 
Miyao, R. 2006. Time series analysis of macroeconomic monetary policy. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai 
21 
 
Shinbunsha. (in Japanese) 
Modigliani, F., R. Rasche, and J.P. Cooper. 1970. “Central Bank Policy, the Money Supply, and the 
Short Term Rate of Interest,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.2, pp.166-218. 
Modigliani, F., and R. Shiller. 1973. “Inflation, Rational Expectations, and the Term Structure of 
Interest Rates,” Economica, Vol.40, pp12-43. 
Lopez, J. A., A. Rose, and M. M. Spiegel. 2018. “Why Have Negative Nominal Interest Rates Had 
Such a Small Effect on Bank Performance? Cross Country Evidence,” NBER Working Paper, No. 
25004. 
Ogawa, K., and K. Kitasaka. 1998. Asset Markets and Business Cycles (in Japanese), Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun Shya. 
Sadahiro, A. 1992. Macroeconomic Analysis of Japan. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. (in Japanese) 
Shibata, T. 2016. “Modeling for the world crude oil and natural gas markets,” IDE Discussion Paper, 
No.584, 
Shibata, T. and H. Kosaka. 2018. “An econometric analysis of unconventional monetary policy: the 
cases of Japan and United States,” IDE Discussion Paper, No.704. 
Tobin, J. 1969, “A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, Vol. 1(1), pp. 15-29. 
Ueda, K. 1993a. “A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy: Short-Run Monetary 
Control and the Transmission Mechanism,” in K. Singleton (ed.), Japanese Monetary Policy 
(Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press). 
Ueda, K. 1993b. “Japanese Monetary Policy from 1970 to 1990: Rules or Discretion?,” in K. 
Shigehara (ed.), Price Stabilization in the 1990s (London: Macmillan). 
 
